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Right to Counsel
in Immigration Proceedings*
Charles Gordon**
INTRODUCTION
In any discussion of immigration procedure it must be borne in
mind that the immigration process always has been administra-
tive rather than judicial.' Administrative officers have been en-
trusted with the powers of investigation, interrogation, detention,
accusation, decision, ejection, and with the power to grant dis-
cretionary relief.2 The courts have been given no direct role in this
process except in a limited zone of review to assure that the pro-
ceedings were legally conducted.'
It is also evident that the immigration process often deals with
momentous personal stakes: the ties of citizenship, home, family,
job, and friends. Many courts have commented on the severe con-
sequences of an expulsion order, and the relevant case law abounds
with the expressions like that of Justice Brandeis, who pointed
out that expulsion could separate a man from his home and family
and deprive him "of all that makes life worth living."" Yet the
courts thus far have resisted every effort to assimilate deportation
*The opinions expressed are the author's and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of the Department of Justice.
**Regional Counsel for the Northwest Region, United States Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service. Co-author of GomoN & RosEN IELD, IM-
MIGRATION LAW AND PRocEDuRE (1959).
1. An exceptional situation prevailed for a time under the Chinese Ex-
clusion Laws under which determinations of deportability were made by
United States Commissioners and district courts. See United States v. Woo
Jan, 245 U.S. 552 (1918); Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193(1902). This judicial process fell into disuse after the enactment of the 1907
Immigration Act, which permitted administrative deportation proceedings
against Chinese. See United States v. Wong You, 223 U.S. 67 (1912). The
Chinese Exclusion Laws were repealed by the Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch.
344, 57 Stat. 600.
2. Cases upholding this formula for administrative adjudication include
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272(1912); Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
3. See Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927). See generally
Gordon, Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions, 37 INTERPRETER RE-
LEsAEs 289 (1960).
4. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Other expressions
are collected in GORDON & ROSENFIELD, IMMiGRATiON LAWv AND PRO-
CEDuRE 397-98 (1959).
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to criminal punishment and to apply the constitutional guarantees
and procedures that relate to criminal prosecutions.' The immi-
gration process thus remains civil in nature, but it is endowed with
a number of uniquely coercive powers.
Our discussion of the right to counsel must be viewed in this
context. It must take into account the currently accepted view
that the immigration process is civil and administrative, not crimi-
nal and judicial. But it must have regard at the same time for the
growing awareness of the vital interests involved and of the need
for assuring the fullest protection of basic human rights.
I. GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF DUE PROCESS
Since the immigration process is not deemed a criminal trial,
the sixth amendment's guaranty of counsel to an accused person
is inapplicable.6 But it does not follow that one involved in an im-
migration proceeding can summon no constitutional protection;
the fifth amendment's assurance of procedural due process of
law always has had a measurable impact in immigration proceed-
ings.7 And, as we shall see, the due process clause usually has
been regarded as encompassing the right to be represented by
counsel.
Immigration proceedings cover a wide range, and the same con-
cepts of procedural due process do not apply equally to prelimi-
nary investigations, exclusion hearings, deportation hearings, and
applications for discretionary relief.8 Moreover, it must constantly
be recalled that the immigration process is a comparative newcom-
er in the ancient tribunals of the law.9 The immigration process
5. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (ex post facto law and bill
of attainder); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (ex post facto
law); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (bail); Fong Yuc Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (various constitutional provisions).
6. Ibid.; Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833, 838 (D. Mass. 1915);
VAN VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS 180 (1932).
7. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). However, the protection of the fifth
amendment thus far has not provided substantive due process-the right to
question the grounds for exclusion and deportation prescribed by Congress.
See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952). Cf., Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Ad-
mitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578
(1959); Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Perma-
nent Resident Alien: The Inherent Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 261
(1959).
8. For variant concepts of due process in relation to exclusion proceed-
ings and applications for discretionary relief, see Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345(1956) (discretionary relief); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)
(exclusion). Cf., Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70
HAR. L. REv. 193, 249-51 (1956).
9. Although general federal legislation was inaugurated by the Act of
[Vol. 45:875876
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has been severely criticized at various stages in its development,
and some of the criticisms have dealt with deprivations of represen-
tation by counsel."0 Because of such criticism and also because of
constantly developing attitudes of legislators, courts, and adminis-
trators, the procedural protections in immigration cases have been
steadily enlarged to comport with changing notions of justice.
II. THE NEED FOR COUNSEL
The persons involved in immigration proceedings usually are
aliens, and generally they are in the less privileged economic class.
Often they are at the threshold of our country, or have recently ar-
rived, and they may have little or no comprehension of our lan-
guage or institutions. The cases affecting these individuals some-
times pose complicated factual or legal questions. Obviously the
services of counsel can be quite valuable in protecting these per-
sons' rights and status."
Some examples will illustrate the types of situations in which
the services of counsel may be useful." A person may be charg-
ed with being a deportable alien and notified to report for a hear-
ing on the deportation charges.' 3 A person arriving at the border
may be required to submit to a hearing to determine his admissi-
bility to the United States.'4 An alien in temporary or illegal status
in this country may seek to legalize his residence through proceed-
ings known as suspension of deportation,' adjustment of status,"0
or registry of lawful entry.'7 A person in this country may peti-
tion for preferred or exempt status under the quota on behalf of a
Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214, the assignment of enforcement re-
sponsibilities to a federal agency, then the Treasury Department, was in-
augurated by the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 7, 26 Stat. 1085.
10. The major criticisms are found in the following studies: (1) Report
on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the United States, known
as the Wickersham Commission Report and prepared for the National Com-
mission on Law Observance and Enforcement by Reuben Oppenheimer
(G.P.O. 1931); (2) CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS (1931); (3) VAN
VLEcK, op. cit. supra note 6; (4) Report of the Ellis Island Committee
(privately printed, 1934); (5) Report of Secretary of Labor's Committee to
Study Immigration Practice and Procedure (1940); (6) Whom We Shall
Welcome, Report of President's Commission on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, known as Perlman Commission Report (G.P.O. 1953).
11. See 5 Wickersham Commission Report 107, 155 (1941); VAN VLECK,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 231-32.
12. For fuller description see Gordon, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 42 Cm. BA. REc. 11 (1960).
13. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 242 [hereafter
referred to as Act of 1952], 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1958).
14. See 66 Stat. 200 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1958).
15. 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1958).
16. 71 Stat. 641, 642 (1957), 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1958).
17. 72 Stat. 546 (1958), 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1958).
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relative."8 An alien in temporary or illegal status in this country
may seek to obtain a visa from an American consul in a neighbor-
ing country.' 9
In earlier days some administrative authorities looked with dis-
favor upon attorneys and sought to discourage their participa-
tion."° In part this attitude no doubt was caused by a desire to
avoid the difficulties that lawyers would place in the path of ad-
ministrators; in part it may have stemmed from the activities of
some unscrupulous practitioners. Even the critics of deportation
procedure called attention to the unscrupulous minority, while urg-
ing the need for expanded representation by counsel. 1
A different attitude prevails today. The activities of the un-
scrupulous practitioner have been minimized and are no longer a
serious problem. Administrators are now more alert to the need
for protecting constitutional rights. The lawyer seeking to represent
a party to an immigration proceeding no longer is regarded with
suspicion. His participation in the immigration proceeding gener-
ally is welcomed as an assurance of due process.2 There is now
an Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers, organized
nationally and in local chapters, which publishes its own periodical
and seeks to exert influence in the legislative, administrative, and
judicial arenas. And immigration committees have been established
by the American Bar Association and by local bar associations.
Early studies of the expulsion process found that respondents
in such proceedings were represented by counsel in less than 20
per cent of the cases.23 In exclusion cases counsel were permit-
ted, as we shall note, only on appeal, and the proportion of rep-
resented applicants was far less. 4 The commentators found that
in both instances there was a vast need for greater opportunities
to be represented by counsel. Their studies revealed that represen-
tation by counsel had a marked effect on the chances for success,
even in the administrative proceeding, and that represented aliens
prevailed in a far higher proportion of cases, since their counsel
were much more effective in raising points of law, in questioning
due process, in marshalling relevant evidence, and in advancing
claims to United States citizenship. The commentators found that
18. 66 Stat. 180 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1958).
19. See Adjustment of Status and Immigraton Via Canada, 38 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 8 (1961).
20. See VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 231.
21. See 5 Wickersham Commission Report 106-07, 155 (1931); Re-
port of the Ellis Island Committee 104 (1934); Report of Secretary of
Labor's Committee 71, 83 (1940).
22. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 20.
23. 5 Wickersham Commission Report 85 (1931); VAN VLEcIC, op. Cit.
supra note 6, at 99.
24. VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 213, 218.
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the employment of counsel often depended on such fortuitous
circumstances as the ability to pay or the fact that a private or-
ganization had become interested in the party's case.'
The picture in this respect also has changed somewhat over the
years. The proportion of represented aliens has increased appreci-
ably, although it is doubtless still true that the majority of parties
involved in immigration proceedings are not represented by coun-
sel. Facilities for legal assistance have expanded and the adminis-
trative authorities often advise the indigent alien how he may ob-
tain counsel. Yet many parties are unrepresented and it is evident
to most observers that the party himself and the administrative
process as well could benefit from greater participation by coun-
sel.26
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. IN GENERAL.
Before 1952 there was no statute specifically recognizing the
right to counsel in immigration proceedings. As we have seen, the
right to counsel depended on the fifth amendment's assurance of
procedural due process of law. Essentially, procedural due process
means fairness in granting an opportunity to be heard and in arriv-
ing at the decision. We have also pointed out that due process
is an expanding concept which reflects current notions of fair-
ness.
28
Expositions of the elements of due process in immigration
cases by early authorities did not specifically mention a right to
counsel2 9 This omission did not mean that the right to counsel
was not recognized but that it was evaluated as an aspect in the
total picture of fair dealing.30 As we shall see, the right to counsel
is now explicitly endorsed in statutes and regulations. Deviations
from procedural rights recorded in this fashion would, of course,
25. 5 Wickersham Commission Report 107, 143, 155, 168 (1931); VAN
VLECK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 213, 218, 231, 232.
26. 5 Wickersham'Commission Report 155, 169 (1931); VAN VLECK,
op. cit. supra note 6.
27. Early, but fairly comprehensive, statements summarizing the ele-
ments of due process in deportation cases are found in The Japanese Immi-
grant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903); Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed.
745, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1915).
28. See WongYang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
29. See, e.g., The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Ungar
v. Seaman, 4 F.2d 80, 82 (8th Cir. 1924); Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed.
745 (8th Cir. 1915); CLARK, DE-PORTATION OF ALIENS 375 (1931).
30. See Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833 (D. Mass. 1915); Whit-
field v. Hanges, supra note 29. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 ,U.S. 458,
462-63 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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offend due process.31 But even without specific statutory sanction,
it seems manifest that under present concepts a party to an immi-
gration proceeding ordinarily has a right to be represented by
counsel of his own choosing, if he wishes such representation.
The succeeding discussion will indicate that this right is perhaps
not an absolute right at all stages of the proceeding. Moreover,
the absence of counsel may not be regarded as fatal when the
party is unprejudiced by such an omission, as when deportability
is clear under the admitted facts and applicable law. 2 Con-
versely, the presence of counsel often has a bearing on whether
due process was granted. If counsel was present throughout, the
courts are less likely to find breaches of fair play, particularly when
no complaint was made in the administrative proceeding.33 On
the other hand, if the party was not represented by counsel the
proceedings will be scrutinized more closely, and doubtful proced-
ural questions often are resolved in favor of the unrepresented
party. 4 Now, as before, the observance of due process require-
ments is judged by appraising the proceedings in their entirety to
ascertain whether there was fair dealing under the circumstances
and in the light of current standards.3" Thus, it is often advan-
tageous to the administrative authorities to have counsel present in
order to assure a fair and expeditious proceeding.
B. DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
1. Preliminary interrogations
As in other regulatory or accusatory proceedings the deportation
hearing is preceded by an investigation to determine whether any
basis for action exists, and statements are taken from persons who
later may become involved in such proceedings. The officials of
other agencies conducting such inquiries frequently have refused
to permit counsel, believing that counsel might encumber effective
31. See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135 (1945).
32. De Bernardo v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert..denied, 358
U.S. 816 (1958); Madokoro v. Del Guercio, 160 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1947);
Ciccerelli v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1926); Alves v. Shaughnessy,
107 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
33. See Schenck v. Ward, 80 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1935); Greco v. Haff,
63 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1933); Ex parte Keizo Kamiyama, 44 F.2d 503 (9th
Cir. 1930). Cf. Barrese v. Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960) (when
fair opportunity to obtain counsel for administrative appeal was not given,
court refused to consider merits and remanded case to enable respondent
to be represented by counsel on such appeal).
34. See Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1958); Cas-
tro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
35. Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, supra note 34; Weinbrand v. Prentis, 4
F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1925); Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, supra note 34; 1
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 557 (1958).
[Vol. 45: 875
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investigation.36 The immigration authorities have shared this feel-
ing, and until recently they did not permit counsel at such prelimi-
nary interrogations.
The early critics of the deportation process leveled their heaviest
shafts against such interrogations, terming them private inquisi-
tions. They pointed out that the entire factual basis of the charge
often is developed at the preliminary interrogation at which the
prospective respondent is unrepresented by counsel. They believed
that there would be greater assurance of fairness if the alien were
permitted counsel. 8
These criticisms perhaps had greater validity under former pro-
cedures, when the deportation proceeding was commenced by the
arrest of the respondent and the preliminary interrogation frequent-
ly occurred between the time of such arrest and the hearing."m
Since February, 1956, deportation proceedings are commenced
by service of an order to show cause, and arrests are rare.40 In-
vestigations now are usually completed before the order to show
cause is issued.
The authorities generally have held that the absence of counsel
or the refusal to permit counsel at such a preliminary interroga-
tion does not make the procedure unfair or preclude use of the
resulting statement at a hearing where the respondent has the right
to be represented by counsel. 41 Recently the United States Su-
preme Court, albeit by slim majorities, has upheld similar exclu-
36. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
37. See 5 Wickersham Commission Report 85, 137, 143, 174 (1931);
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 29, at 331; VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 182, 231; Report of Secretary of Labor's Committee 18, 69-72, 83
(1940).
38. Ibid.
39. See 5 Wickersham Commission Report 137, 142, 143 (1931); CLARK
op. cit. supra note 29, at 331-32; and cases cited in notes 41-50 infra.
The Wickersham Report, at page 84, notes the declaration of Assistant Sec-
retary of Labor Louis F. Post, announced on April 12, 1920, 59 CONG.
REc. 5560-61, that statements made by an alien while he was in cus-
tody would not be used unless he had a fair opportunity to be represented
by counsel.
40. See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 521, 526.
41. Use of statements upheld when made: (1) while in custody of immi-
gration officers, Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1912);
Ex parte Ematsu Kishimoto, 32 F.2d 991 (9th Cir 1929); In re Kosopud,
272 Fed. 330 (N.D. Ohio 1920); (2) while in custody of other officials, Ex
parte Vilarino, 50 F.2d 582- (9th Cir. 1931) (statement to immigration of-
ficers, while in police custody); Plane v. Carr, 19 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 545 (1927) (statement to police officers while under ar-
rest for prostitution); and (3) to immigration officers, when not in custody,
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 156 (1923); Drachmos v. Hughes, 26 F.
Supp. 192 (D.N.L 1938).
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sions of counsel in preliminary investigations by a fire marshal"
and by police officers.43
Again the situation must be examined in totality, and allega-
tions of unfairness will be assessed in the total setting. Significant
factors in such an assessment may be whether the party was under
restraint,44 whether he was aware of his rights,45 whether he was
represented by counsel at the hearing itself,4" and whether the pro-
ceeding was otherwise fair and deportability clearly established.47
Of course, a confession will be invalidated if procedures announc-
ed in the statute or regulations are not followed 48 or if the exclu-
sion of counsel is coupled with coercion or other improper action
on the part of the immigration officers.49
To some extent the problem has been resolved by section 6 (a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act which grants to a party com-
pelled to appear before an administrative agency "the right to be
accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel."5 The immi-
gration authorities have gone beyond this statutory directive. Even
when the attendance of a witness at a preliminary inquiry in an
immigration case is not compelled, which is the usual situation,
he is now permitted to be accompanied and advised by counsel
if he so desires. This practice is not announced in any regulation,
and neither practice nor regulation requires that such a witness
42. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). However, the concurring opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, emphasized
that this was not a "secret inquisition of those suspected of arson," or an
"examination of suspects," but rather an inquiry to ascertain the causes
and responsibility for the fire. Id. at 336.
43. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958). No unfairness was found in these cases since the suspects
were aware of their rights and no coercion was present.
44. Cf. authorities cited at note 41 supra. However, in Ungar v. Sea-
man, 4 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1924), unfair procedure was found when the
statement was taken without counsel, while under immigration arrest, with-
out notice of the charges or opportunity to meet them.
45. Ibid. However, in the absence of a regulation requiring that the
party be advised of a right to counsel or forbidding interrogation without
counsel, an interrogation without such advice or privilege was not deemed
unfair. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 156 (1923).
46. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1912); Landon v.
Clarke, 239 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1956) (no objection to statement at hear-
ing); Beck v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997
(1953) (admitted truth of statements at hearing); Ex parte Ematsu Kishi-
moto, 32 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1929) (statement at preliminary interrogation
believed, although retracted at hearing); Drachmos v. Hughes, 26 F. Supp.
192 (D.N.J. 1938).
47. Ibid.
48. See notes 31, 45 supra.
49. Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960); Roux v. Commission-
er, 203 Fed. 413 (9th Cir. 1913); Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17, 46
(D. Mass. 1920).
50. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).
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be advised of a privilege of representation by counsel. When coun-
sel appears in such preliminary interrogations he may advise his
client, but usually is permitted no further participation in the in-
quiry.51
2. Deportation hearings
The resemblance in the situations of a respondent in a depor-
tation hearing and of a defendant in a criminal trial strongly sug-
gests the desirability of and need for representation by counsel in
a deportation hearing. Until 1952 no immigration statute com-
manded such a right of representation but the right always has
been recognized, and has been announced in the administrative
regulations, which usually have required also that the respondent
be advised of his right to be represented by counsel.52
Some years ago it was debated whether due process would be
satisfied if the respondent were permitted counsel only after the
hearing had been initiated and had traversed a substantial portion
of its route. Those who favored the affirmative of this questionm
relied on an early, ambiguous utterance of the United States Su-
preme Court, which probably was addressed to the preliminary in-
terrogation rather than the hearing itself.54 This view was re-
flected at times in the early administrative regulations.' Thus, at
the time of the "Palmer Red raids" of January, 1920,0 the regu-
lations were amended to allow a right to be represented by coun-
sel, "preferably at the beginning of the hearing or, at any rate, as
soon as such hearing had proceeded sufficiently to protect the
51. See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 517.
52. For references to earlier regulations see BouvE, EXCLUSION AND
ExPuLsioN OF ALENS 292, 618 (1912) (referring at the latter point to a
"limited" participation by counsel); 5 Wickersham Commission Report 83-
85 (1931); CLARK, op. cit. supra note 29, at 365; VAN VLEcK, op. cit. su-
pra note 6, at 97-98, 162; Report of the Secretary of Labor's Committee
27, 82 (1940).
53. See Seif v. Nagle, 14 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1926) (waived counsel);
Guiney v. Bonham, 261 Fed. 582 (9th Cir. 1919); VAN VLEcK, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 181. But in two cases the courts have held that refusal
to permit counsel until late in the hearing offended due process. Whitfield
v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 751 (8th Cir. 1915) (such procedure "tended
to prevent a fair hearing"); Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833, 838
(D. Mass. 1915) (finding the officers "were endeavoring to make out a case,
rather than to act in a fair or judicial manner toward the alien").
54. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1912). In the less
meticulous practice of that era there was perhaps only a shadowy boun-
dary between the end of the interrogation and the commencement of
the hearing.
55. See notes 52-54 supra.
56. For descriptions of this episode see Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed.
17, 31 (D. Mass. 1920); 5 Wickersham Commission Report 84 (1931);
VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 161; POST, THE DEPORTATIONS
DELIRIUm OF 1920 (1923).
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Government's interests." At the end of January, 1920, the regula-
tions were changed back to their original form which permitted
counsel at the beginning of the hearing. 7 This ad hoc shift in
the regulations at the beginning of the month was widely criti-
cized,"8 and it was invalidated by the courts as an unfair device
to entrap prospective respondents in the deportation proceedings
conducted during that month."6
It is hardly likely that anyone would seriously contend in the
climate of today that the right of a respondent in deportation pro-
ceedings to be represented by counsel can be abridged or that he
can be denied counsel for any portion of the deportation hearing.
The present temper of the United States Supreme Court, as ex-
pressed in its recent decisions, irresistibly predicts that such an at-
tempted abridgement would receive short shrift."0 In any event,
such a contention would now be academic, since the statute and
regulations directly assure the respondent in deportation proceed-
ings the privilege of being represented by counsel of his own
choice, throughout the deportation hearing and in taking an appeal
to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
This privilege was embodied in the statute for the first time in
the 1952 codification of the immigration laws."' It likewise is
inscribed in the administrative regulations." At the outset of the
hearing the special inquiry officer is required to advise the re-
spondent of his right to counsel and to afford him a reasonable
opportunity to obtain counsel, if such an opportunity is desired. 3
If counsel is obtained and files an appearance in the proceedings,
he may examine the pertinent records, and all notices, papers, and
57. Colyer v. Skeffington, supra note 56, at 47; VAN VLECK, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 161.
58. Ibid. See also statement of Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis F.
Post, mentioned in note 39 supra.
59. Ex parte Radivoeff, 278 Fed. 227 (D. Mont. 1922); Colyer v. Skef-
fington, 265 Fed. 17, 46 (D. Mass. 1920) (the purpose of the amend-
ment was "to cut the alien off from any representation by counsel"). Judge
Anderson's devastating opinion in Colyer endures as a classic exposition of
due process still cited by courts, legislators, and scholars.
60. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63(1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). But cf. notes 42,
43, supra.
61. 66 Stat. 208, 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1362 (1958).
62. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2(a) (exclusion hearing), 242.10, 242.16(a) (depor-
tation hearing) (Supp. 1960).
63. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2(a), 242.16(a) (Supp. 1960). The special inquiry
officer is a hearing official designated under the 1952 act to conductb1ot
exclusion and deportation hearings. 66 Stat. 200, 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§
1226(a), 1252(b) (1958). He is designated by the Attorney General and is
not selected under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 66 Stat. 166(1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (1958); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302
(1955).
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decisions are served on him.' He may represent his client fully
in the hearing and subsequent proceedings by offering evidence,
examining and cross examining witnesses, making legal objections
and arguments, taking an appeal from an adverse decision, and
arguing the appeal in person before the Board of Immigration
Appeals.65 Of course, counsel's activities may be subject to re-
strictions comparable to those seen in court proceedings, such as
reasonable limitations on cross-examination 6 and participation of
the special inquiry officer in the questioning to clarify points he
deems unclear.6 7
The respondent is entitled, however, only to a fair opportunity
to obtain counsel.68 If he is given such opportunity and fails to
procure counsel, 9 or if his counsel has been given adequate no-
tice and fails to appear,7 the hearing may proceed without coun-
sel. In such situations, however, the courts will scrutinize the rec-
ord carefully to make certain that fundamental fairness was ac-
corded and that justice was done.7' Of course, the right to repre-
64. 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.4, 292.5 (1958). An unusual provision of the regu-
lations, which survives from past suspicion of attorneys, permits counsel to
borrow a copy of the testimony only on his assurance that he will return
it without making a copy. 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(b) (Supp. 1960). Cf. Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 6(b), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(b)(1958).
65. 8 C.F.R. §§ 31.1(e) (argument of appeal), 236.2(a) (exclusion hear-
ing), 242.16(a) (deportation hearing), 292.5 (generally) (Supp. 1960).
66. Matter of S., 5 I. & N. Dec. 60 (1953).
67. See Matter of K.H.C., 5 I. & N. Dec. 312 (1953).
68. Wlodinger v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1939); Dengeleski v.
Tillinghast, 65 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1933). See Barrese v. Ryan, 189 F. Supp.
449 (D. Conn. 1960) (when fair opportunity not given, case remanded to
enable him to obtain counsel).
69. Madokoro v. Del Guercio, 160 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1947); Wlodinger
v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1939); Ciccerelli v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394(2d Cir. 1926)1 In re Raimondi, 126 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1954). In
each of the cited cases the alien was in custody and counsel was not read-
ily available to him. In Bisaillon v. Hogan, 257 F.2d 435 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 872 (1958), counsel was barred from practice, but re-
spondent agreed to proceed without counsel. Respondent was, however,
represented by counsel on the administrative appeal and before the court.
70. United States v. Heikkinen, 240 F.2d 94 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 355 U.S. 273 (1957) (counsel refused to attend hearing at new
place to which it was transferred upon respondent's change of address);
Giaimo v. Pederson, 289 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1961) (counsel consulted but
did not appear; apparently because place of confinement was changed);
Dengeleski v. Tillinghast, 65 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1933) (alien had requested
counsel to appear but he did not come); Weinbrand v. Prentis, 4 F.2d 778(6th Cir. 1925) (counsel notified but did not attend); Gould v. Uhl, 6 F.
Sipp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (counsel refused to attend hearing unless it was
postponed until after respondent had completed jail sentence).
71. Giaimo v. Pederson, supra note 70 (represented by counsel on ap-
peal and before court; on appeal raised no counsel at hearing); Van
Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1958) (court not
satisfied that reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel had been offer-
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sentation by counsel would be meaningless if the respondent does
not have a reasonable opportunity to exercise it because of im-
proper influence or action by government officers,72 insufficient
notification of his rights,73 inadequate comprehension of the lan-
guage,74 or because of mental incapacity.75 Deviations from fun-
damental fairness in these respects or by failing to accord rights
granted by the regulations will be corrected by the courts.
A more difficult question is posed when the hearing is conduct-
ed while the respondent is incarcerated. Since imprisonment is no
longer a normal aspect of the deportation proceeding,70 the prob-
ed-facts inadequately developed); Bisaillon v. Hogan, 257 F.2d 435 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 872 (1958) (respondent, who was not indi-
gent, agreed to proceed without counsel at hearing and was subsequently
represented by counsel on appeal and before court); De Bernardo v. Rog-
ers, 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) (only le-
gal questions presented were fully argued by counsel in court); Madokoro
v. Del Guercio, 160 F.2d 164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947)
(facts admitted); Wlodinger v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1939) (pro-
cedure fair); Dengeleski v. Tillinghast, 65 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1933) (pro-
cedure fair); Ciccerelli v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1926) (procedure
fair); Prassinos v. District Director, 193 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ohio 1960),
aff'd mem., 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 1925 (1961)
(evidence showed him clearly deportable); In re Raimondi, 126 F. Supp.
390 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (deportability undisputed); Castro-Louzan v. Zimmer-
man, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (court not satisfied that reasonable
opportunity to obtain counsel had been offered, facts inadequately devel-
oped); Gould v. Uhl, 6 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (procedure fair).
Cf. Barrese v. Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960) (when fair oppor-
tunity to obtain counsel for administrative appeal not given, court refused
to consider merits and remanded case to enable respondent to be represent-
ed by counsel on such appeal).
72. Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960) (intimidation); Plane
v. Carr, 19 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1927) (improper refusal to permit counsel,
but error was rectified by action of administrative authorities in reopening
case and admitting counsel); Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 749-51
(8th Cir. 1915) (improper refusal to permit counsel); Roux v. Commis-
sioner, 203 Fed. 413 (9th Cir. 1913) (improper persuasion and undue in-
fluence); Barrese v. Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960) (notice of
decision misdirected, respondent refused reasonable continuance to obtain
counsel for appeal); Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17, 46 (D. Mass.
1920) (improper refusal to permit counsel); Bosny v. Williams, 185 Fed.
598 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (improper persuasion and intimidation). Cf. Acker-
mann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950) (advice deemed not improper);
Percas v. Karnuth, 28 F. Supp. 597 (W.D.N.Y. 1939) (same).
73. Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1924) (preliminary statement);
Barrese v. Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960) (notice of decision
misdirected, denied reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel for appeal).
74. Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1958); Castro-
Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
75. In re Osterloh, 34 F.2d 223 (S.D. Texas 1929); Dioguardi v. Flynn,
15 F.2d 576 (W.D.N.Y. 1926); United States v. Van De Mark, 3 F. Supp.
101 (W.D.N.Y. 1933). In Matter of H., 6 I. & N. Dec. 358 (1954), the
rights of a mental incompetent were found to have been amply protected
when his wife and counsel were present at the hearing and he himself tes-
tified.
76. See note 40 supra.
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lem usually arises when the respondent is serving a sentence follow-
ing a conviction for crime. The hearing is held in a penal insti-
tution, often far removed from the respondent's normal residence,
and he frequently asserts inability to obtain counsel or to conduct
his defense under such circumstances. In such instances the pro-
fessed difficulties sometimes are neither unreal nor insubstantial.77
The United States Supreme Court and other courts have ruled
that a hearing is not necessarily unfair merely because the respond-
ent is confined to a penal institution and that in such cases he is
not denied counsel merely because he claims it is difficult for him
to procure counsel. 78 A district court has held, on the other hand,
that in the particular circumstances before it a newly arrived alien
confined in prison had not been accorded the privilege of represen-
tation by counsel.79 Again the criterion must be whether under
all the circumstances the respondent had a fair opportunity to ob-
tain counsel and a fair opportunity to develop the legal and factual
defenses available to him.
C. EXCLUSION HEARINGS
Quite different has been the development of a right to counsel
in exclusion hearings, which pass on the admissibility of an entry
applicant whose right to enter is in dispute. s0 Being at the
threshold, such an applicant is deemed outside the United States,
and the due process injunctions of the fifth .amendment have not
been regarded as fully applicable."' Procedures to determine ad-
missibility have been prescribed in statutes and regulations, and
77. See Giaimo v. Pederson, 289 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1961) (had con-
sulted counsel who did not appear at hearing; apparently because place of
confinement had been changed); Madokoro v. Del Guercio, 160 F.2d 164
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947) (in internment camp-funds
or counsel not readily available); In re Raimondi, 126 F. Supp. 390 (N.D.
Cal. 1954) (in McNeil Island, Wash., prison, counsel and home in San
Francisco); Gould v. Uhl, 6 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (counsel refused
to attend hearing in jail).
78. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 158 (1923); Wlodinger v. Reimer,
103 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1939); Dengeleski ex rel. Saccardio v. Tillinghast, 65
F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1933); Ciccerelli v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1926);
Gould v. Uhl, supra note 77.
79. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950)(alien impoverished, without friends, family, or knowledge of language;
facts inadequately developed).
80. The present statutory sanction for exclusion hearings is 66 Stat. 200
(1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1958). The relating regulations are in 8 C.F.R.
§ 236 (Supp. 1960). For the distinction between exclusion and deportation
see Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
81. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Shaughnessy v. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Cf.
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
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the controlling authorities have found the entry applicant entitled
only to the observance of those procedures."2
Before 1952 hearings in exclusion cases were conducted by
boards of special inquiry composed of three immigration officials.
The statute specified that the hearings before such boards must
be separate and apart from the public and that the alien might
have a friend or relative present and might have the services of
counsel on appeal from the decision of the board of special in-
quiry.s3 The administrative regulations interpreted this statutory
language as authorizing denial of counsel before boards of special
inquiry, and they permitted counsel only on appeal from the
board's decision. s4 The theory upon which the assistance of coun-
sel before the boards of special inquiry was denied was that it
would impede the swift determinations necessary in entry cases
and that the applicant's rights were sufficiently safeguarded by
permitting representation of counsel on appeal.s5
The early critics of the immigration process challenged this de-
nial of counsel before the board of special inquiry as not required
by the statute and unfair in practice."" However, the courts upheld
this regulation as consistent with the statute and with due proc-
ess.
8 7
After the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946
Attorney General Tom C. Clark directed that the privilege of rep-
resentation by counsel be allowed in hearings before boards of
special inquiry. This directive was incorporated in the published
regulations and has been followed since then.8 The codification
of the immigration laws in 1952 endorsed this practice and speci-
fied that the exclusion hearing thereafter was to be held before a
single special inquiry officer and that the entry applicant was
82. Ibid.
83. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 16, 17, 39 Stat. 885-
87.
84. BouvE, ExCLUSION AND EXPULSION OF ALIENs 29, 617 (1912);
VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 47, 76, 180; Report o/ Secretary of
Labor's Committee 23, 53 (1940).
85. Buccino v. Williams, 190 Fed. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); VAN VLECK,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 180.
86. VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 213, 218; Report of
Secretary of Labor's Committee 55 (1940). The latter Report was highly
critical of the decisions of the boards of special inquiry, finding them 'one
of the least satisfactory parts of the Immigration Service work." Id. at 49.
87. Brownlow v. Miers, 28 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1928); Buccino v. Wil-
liams, 190 Fed. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). See also Quon Quon Poy v. John-
son, 273 U.S. 352 (1927) (presence of friend or relative waived); Dong
Yick Yuen v. Dunton, 297 Fed. 447 (2d Cir. 1924); Chin Fook Wah v. Dun-
ton, 288 Fed. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (exclusion of applicant's father from
hearing made the hearing unfair).
88. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2 (Supp. 1960).
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entitled to the privilege of being represented by counsel of his
choice.8 9
The allowance of counsel in exclusion cases has worked satis-
factorily. As so often happens with procedural reforms, the fears
expressed by the opponents have proved unfounded. The present
regulations provide for a full hearing with representation by coun-
sel" except in security cases, in which a hearing may be de-
nied.91 The special inquiry officer-is required to inform the appli-
cant at the outset of the hearing of his right to be represented by
counsel.92 If counsel is engaged, he participates as fully in the
exclusion proceedings as he would in a deportation case. The right
to representation by counsel in exclusion and deportation hearings
thus can now be regarded as quite comparable. 93
D. M.ISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS UNDER THE ImMIIIGRATION
LAWS
A most important type of application is a visa to come to the
United States. The application for a visa must be presented to an
American consul stationed in a foreign country.9" No hearing is
prescribed and none is given. There is no right of appeal to an
administrative body or the courts.95 However, counsel sometimes
serve in these cases by assisting in assembling documents required
by the consul and in soliciting an informal review of a consul's re-
89. 66 Stat. 200 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1958); 8 C.F.R. § 236 (Supp.
1960). See S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1952); H. Rup.
No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1952). The preliminary study of the
Senate Judiciary Committee in 1950 approved the administrative practice
and recommended that the "alien should be permitted to have counsel
present." S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 618 (1950).
90. 8 C.F.R. § 236 (Supp. 1960).
91. 66 Stat. 200 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1958); 8 C.F.R. § 235.8
(1958); Nicoleff v. Shaughnessy, 139 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
92. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (Supp. 1960).
93. The burden of proof is different in exclusion and deportation hear-
ings. In the former the burden is on the applicant for entry. In the latter
the burden of proof generally is on the government. 66 Stat. 234 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1958); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
94. 66 Stat. 193 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1958). In some exceptional
instances involving foreign government officials, the application for a tem-
porary visa can be made in the United States. 22 C.F.R. § 41.120 (Supp.
1960).
95. This absence of procedural safeguards is criticized in Perlman Com-
mission Report 146-52 (G.P.O. 1953); Rosenfield, Consular Non-Revielv-
ability, 41 A.B.A.J. 1109 (1955); Wildes, Review of Denial of Visa, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 17, 18, 19, 1959, p. 4. The current practice is defended in Auer-
bach, The Administration of the Immigration Laws by the Department of
State and the Foreign Service, 36 INTERPETER RELEASEs 6, Vm OF.
BULL. 40 (1959); Auerbach, The Visa Process and Review of Visa Appli-
cations, 37 INrrERPRETER RELEAsEs 305, VmA OFF. BULL. 63 (1960).
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fusal of a visa by the Department of State through a process
known as an "advisory opinion.""
Many additional types of applications are made to the Imnmi-
gration and Naturalization Service, usually by persons in the Unit-
ed States. These include: applications for approval of visa petitions
on behalf of aliens seeking preferred status ;97 applications by
aliens in the United States for legalizing their irregular status
through processes known as suspension of deportation,98 adjust-
ment of status,99 registry of lawful entry,' 0 and waiver of in-
admissibility;' and applications for stay of deportation because
of anticipated physical persecution in the country of their destina-
tion. 2 Most of these applications involve the exercise of discre-
tion and their consideration is somewhat informal. However, ad-
ministrative regulations extend the privilege of being represented
by counsel to every case pending before the service in which an
examination is required by regulations, and counsel in such cases
is permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce
evidence, to make objections, and to submit briefs."0 3
IV. WHO MAY PRACTICE
For many years the immigration regulations have included
some description of the persons who might practice in immigration
cases and have sought to prescribe standards of conduct.' The
privilege of practice usually has been accorded to attorneys and
to designated representatives of recognized social agencies. A 1944
change in the regulations established a requirement of special ad-
mission to practice before the Immigration Service and the Board
96. Ibid.; Gordon, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 42 On-
CAGo B. REcoRD 11, 14 (1960).
97. 66 Stat. 179, 180 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1155 (1958); 8 C.F.R.§§ 204, 205 (1958).
98. 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1958); 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.16(c),
244.1 (Supp. 1960).
99. 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1958); 8 C.F.R. § 245 (1958).
100. 66 Stat. 219 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1958); 8 C.F.R. § 249
(Supp. 1960).
101. 66 Stat. 182 (1952) 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1958); 71 Stat. 640(1957), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (1958).
102. 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1958); 8 C.F.R.
§ 243.3(b) (Supp. 1960).
103. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (Supp. 1960).
104. See BOUVE, op. cit. supra note 84, at 291-92, 617-18; 5 Wick-
ersham Commission Report 106 (1931). When Bouve wrote, the reg-
ulations limited counsel fees to $10 per case, and at the time of the Wick-
ersham Report in 1929 a limitation of a $25 fee in admission cases was
prescribed, but these limitations were never enforced. The present regula-
tions provide for discipline if counsel charges fees "deemed to be grossly
excessive in relation to the services performed." 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(1)(Supp. 1960). But apparently this sanction likewise has not been invoked.
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of Immigration Appeals." 5 Each applicant had to pay a fee of
$25.00 and submit an application showing compliance with pre-
scribed standards, in addition to admission to the bar of the high-
est court in his state. These requirements continued in effect until
revised regulations inaugurating the standards now in effect were
issued on April 23, 195 8.10
Under the current regulations special admission to practice no
longer is required. Any person in the following groups now may
practice before the Immigration Service and the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals: 07
a. Any attorney in good standing in any state or federal
court.
0 8
b. A foreign attorney granted special permission to appear
in an individual case.
c. An accredited representative of a religious, charitable, so-
cial service, or similar organization recognized as such by the
Board of Immigration Appeals."0 9 Such organizations always have
afforded representation in immigration matters; and while their
activities sometimes are quite different from the normal concept
of the practice of law, they are particularly helpful: (1) in locating
records and documents bearing on cases both in the United States
and in the old country and (2) in detecting major trends and
needs, illustrated by a large volume of cases, which are brought
to the attention of the administrative authorities in proposing
amendments of regulations and procedures."0
d. An accredited official of the alien's government, such as a
consul, if the official appears solely in his official capacity and
with the alien's consent.
The regulations also list various types of misconduct for which
an attorney or representative may be suspended or disbarred from
practice before the Service and the Board."' However, such dis-
ciplinary measures are rarely invoked, and debarment from prac-
tice usually occurs only when an attorney is suspended and dis-
barred by a court or when an accredited representative ends his
connection with the recognized social agency.
105. 9 Fed. Reg. 505 (1944).
106. 8 C.F.R. § 292 (Supp. 1960).
107. 8 C.F.R. § 292.1 (Supp. 1960).
108. For definition of "attorney" see 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(f) (Supp. 1960).
109. The procedure for recognizing such .organizations and accrediting
their representatives is described in 8 C.F.R. § 292.2 (Supp. 1960). "Rcp-
resentative" is defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(j) (Supp. 1960). At present there
are 70 recognized social agencies and 134 accredited representatives of such
agencies listed with the Board of Immigration Appeals.
110. See LOWENSTEIN, THE ALIEN AND THE ImmIGRATION LAv(1958).
111. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (Supp. 1960).
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V. WAIVER OF COUNSEL
Since the right of counsel in exclusion and deportation cases
now is safeguarded by statutes and regulations, hearings ordinarily
are conducted without counsel in such cases only when counsel
has been waived. The special inquiry officer, complying with the
regulations," 2 advises each party at the outset of the hearing of
his right to be represented by counsel. Reasonable continuances
will be granted to afford the party an opportunity to obtain coun-
sel if he wishes such an opportunity. When the party informs the
special inquiry officer, either at the initial or at an adjourned hear-
ing, that he cannot obtain counsel or does not wish to be repre-
sented the special inquiry officer asks him whether he is willing
to proceed without counsel. When an affirmative answer is made
the hearing proceeds without counsel. The colloquies between the
special inquiry officer and the party concerning representation by
counsel are recorded in the hearing record."'
Like most valuable rights the right to be represented by counsel
can be waived. A waiver occurs when the party is informed of his
rights and chooses to proceed without counsel." 4 A hearing can
be conducted without counsel when the party has waived his right
of representation in this manner, since in such cases he has "de-
cided to go it alone and take his chances.""' But again the yard-
stick is whether fundamental fairness was accorded in a broad
view of all the circumstances. The party's waiver must be made
intelligently," 6 with full understanding of his rights, 17 and with-
112. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.2(a) & 242.16(a) (Supp. 1960).
113. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(d) (Supp. 1960).
114. Giaimo v. Pederson, 289 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1961) (when counsel
did not appear at hearing alien stated he wished to go ahead without
counsel); Dentico v. Esperdy, 280 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1960); Coons v. Boyd,
203 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1953); Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580 (2d
Cir. 1950); Hee Chan v. Pilliod, 178 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. 111. 1959). See
also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (requisites of an intelligent
waiver of counsel in criminal prosecution); Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson,
273 U.S. 352 (1927) (waiver of privilege of having friend or relative pres-
ent at board of special inquiry); Prassinos v. District Director, 193 F.
Supp. 416 (N.D. Ohio 1960), af'd mem., 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 1925 (1961); Seif v. Nagle, 14 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.
1926) (waiver when informed of right to counsel during hearing); Barrese v.
Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960) (respondent waived counsel at
hearing but was improperly denied reasonable opportunity to be represent-
ed by counsel on appeal); Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1934)(alien waived counsel at second hearing, after being represented at first).
115. In re Ellis, 144 F. Supp. 448, 449 (N.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 238 F.2d 235
(2d Cir. 1956).
116. See cases cited in note 114 supra.
117. Dentico v. Esperdy, 280 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1960) (under circum-
stances waiver was intelligent, despite alien's poor educational level, where
right to representation clearly explained); Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261
F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1958) (alien who did not understand, speak or read
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out coercion or deception.' n However, ordinarily the voluntari-
ness of the waiver is not deemed affected by the fact that the party
is in jail' or without funds' and has said that he would have
retained counsel if he had been able. Of course, there cannot be
an intelligent waiver by one who is not fully aware of his rights,
either because he was not adequately advised of his right to coun-
sel"2 or because he lacked the mental capacity to comprehend.'2-
VI. PROVIDING COUNSEL BY ASSIGNMENT
OR REFERENCE
Whether the government should or must provide counsel in
immigration cases for a party who desires such representation is a
matter that has been discussed by commentators and courts. We
have previously mentioned the obvious need for counsel in many
situations, particularly when the party is arriving or has recently
entered, and when he desires counsel but is unable to obtain such
assistance because of imprisonment or lack of funds. Immigration
practice never has included any authorization for providing coun-
sel to parties who are unable to obtain such representation. Some
commentators have suggested the desirability of adopting some
such procedure.' But their suggestions have never borne fruit.
Indeed, the present statute specifies that a party in an exclusion
or deportation hearing shall have the privilege of being represented
by counsel "at no expense to the government.' 24
Whether the due process mandate may require the assignment
of counsel to indigent parties in immigration proceedings is a ques-
English was not given reasonable opportunity to be represented by coun-
sel); Handlovits v. Adcock, 80 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mich. 1948) (fair play
not satisfied by perfunctory explanation of rights).
118. Roux v. Commissioner, 203 Fed. 413 (9th Cir. 1913) (improperly
induced not to engage counsel); Bosny v. Williams, 185 Fed. 598 (S.D.N.Y.
1911) (improper persuasion and intimidation). See also note 72 supra.
119. Dengeleski v. Tillinghast, 65 F.2d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 1933); Ciccerelli
v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1926). See also notes 77, 78 supra.
But see Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (due
process not accorded when alien impoverished, without counsel, friends,
family, or knowledge of language, and facts inadequately developed).
120. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1928); Alves v. Shaugh-
nessy, 107 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Cf. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmer-
man, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
121. See note 117 supra.
122. See note 75 supra. In De Souza v. Barber, 263 F.2d 470 (9th
Cir. 1959), a waiver of counsel by a 20 year old infant was not invalid
since he had a clear understanding of his rights and actions.
123. See 5 Wickersham Commission Report 155, 168 (1931); Report
of Secretary of Labor's Committee 83 (1940).
124. 66 Stat 208, 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1362 (1958); Pras-
sinos v. District Director, 193 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ohio 1960), affd mem.,
289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 1925 (1961) (statute does
not require that counsel be present in every case).
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tion not yet definitely resolved. Some analogy may perhaps be
found in the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements deal-
ing with the need to supply counsel to indigent defendants in
criminal cases. It is settled that the sixth amendment demands
such provision for counsel in federal criminal prosecutions."2 5 In
regard to state prosecutions the holdings are not equally decisive,
since the controlling guide is the malleable due process edict of the
fourteenth amendment. Due process requires the assignment of
counsel to indigent defendants in all capital cases,"2 6 but the Su-
preme Court thus far has shied away from any such unqualified
requirement in noncapital state prosecutions, holding that the as-
signment of counsel in such cases is mandatory only when requi-
site for fundamental fairness. 21 However, the tide of decision in
the Supreme Court has run strongly in favor of a generous esti-
mation of the need for representation by counsel in particular
cases as essential to fundamental fairness. 2 '
As we have observed, immigration proceedings are not criminal
cases, but it would not require too great a leap to find that the
conceptions of fundamental fairness under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment should be carried over to the identi-
cal prescription of the fifth amendment. Therefore, it is not incon-
ceivable that a court some day might require assignment of coun-
sel, when the circumstances warrant. The issue here, as always,
is whether the dictates of fundamental fairness have been observed.
In several cases deportation orders have been contested because
the respondent had to proceed without counsel when he desired
such representation but had no funds to retain counsel. In each in-
stance where the claim was made that due process required that
such respondents be provided with counsel in the administrative
proceeding, the courts have avoided confronting this claim and
have ruled in each case that the alien was not prejudiced by the
absence of counsel because the facts were undisputed and the le-
gal issues could be fully resolved in the court proceeding. 2 ' In
other cases the courts have found that under the particular circum-
stances the hearing conducted without counsel was unfair, but they
125. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
126. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
127. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
128. McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S.
633 (1959).
129. De Bernardo v. Rogers, .254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 816 (1958); Madokoro v. Del Guercio, 160 F.2d 164 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947); In re Raimondi, 126 F. Supp. 390 (N.D.
Cal. 1954). See also Alves v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). Cf. Hee Chan v. Pilliod, 178 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. 111. 1959); Hand-
lovits v. Adcock, 80 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mich. 1948); CLARK, op. cit supra
note 29, at 366.
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have not considered the possibility of requiring that counsel be
provided.13° It seems likely that this issue Will continue to be
raised by parties who believe themselves entitled to the assignment
of counsel.
Immigration officers are forbidden to recommend individual at-
torneys. However, there is nothing to prevent them from bring-
ing these cases to the attention of community organizations which
can recommend counsel. In many cities legal representation is
available through lawyers' reference bureaus maintained by bar
associations, through legal aid societies, and through social welfare
agencies such as the United HIAS Service, the Immigrants Protec-
tive League, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Inter-
national Institutes, and other groups. The Association of Immigra-
tion and Nationality Lawyers also has a legal reference service in a
few large cities through arrangement with the local immigration
offices."3 2
Indigent parties thus are not always frustrated in their desire
for counsel. Under the present administrative practice, with its in-
creased appreciation that the utmost fairness of procedure is ad-
vantageous both to the party and the government, an indigent
party who wishes counsel will be aided in obtaining the services of
a community resource, if such a resource is available. The special
inquiry officer will suggest the names of some agencies that may
furnish the desired representation or in some cases he may him-
self communicate with such an agency. The hearing will be con-
tinued to enable the party to obtain such representation. Of course,
this legal reference system works best in large cities, where such
community facilities are readily available. Its value is considerably
less when the hearing is held in an institution or a small town,
where no such community assistance can be obtained.
CONCLUSION
Due process of law of course is not a fixed, immutable concept.
Its dimensions are constantly shifting to meet the needs of each
succeeding era. It is equated with current notions of fairness."
In the immigration process this phenomenon has resulted in a
steady advance in procedural protections. Among these changes has
been a significant increase in safeguards for the right to be repre-
sented by counsel. Concededly the end of the road has not yet
been reached. Perhaps on this road, as in every other aspect of
130. Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1958); Castro-
Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
131. See Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
132. IMMIG ATION B. BULL., Oct.-Dec. 1957, p. 1.
133. Wong Yong Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
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due process, there is no end but rather a continuous journey in
quest of fundamental fairness in a changing world. The most that
can be said at any given moment is that we are headed in the right
direction.
I believe such a conclusion is warranted in regard to the right
to counsel in immigration proceedings. In my view it can reason-
ably be said that some progress has been made, that additional
goals have been sighted on the road ahead, and that the adminis-
trative process has been moving forward steadily toward those
goals.
